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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the abnormal returns and discount/premium to net asset value behaviour
of the ordinary shares both before and after the announcement of “C” share issues.  The
research was conducted using event study methodology and an innovative approach to the
analysis of discount/premium movements.  The results show  that the ordinary shares tended
to outperform the FT-SE Actuaries Investment Trust Index over the six months following a
“C” share issue announcement, despite a reduction in the premium to net asset value rating of
the shares over the same period.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The “C” share issue is an innovation which was developed in 1991 by Aberforth Partners, an
Edinburgh-based fund management firm.  It is designed to be a risk-free and equitable way of
increasing the capital base of an investment trust.  Many of the problems with rights issues
are avoided.
In a “C” share issue, the new money raised is kept separate from the investment trust’s
existing funds until a large percentage of the new money has been invested.  The required
percentage is normally specified in the offer document, and is usually around 75% to 90%.
When the required percentage of the new money has been invested, the new pool of money
ceases to run independently and its shares (the “C” shares) are converted into ordinary
shares.1  This process involves more than just the winding up of the new pool of money and
enlargement of the existing pool.  Both pools are valued precisely so that when the “C” shares
are converted, neither the existing shareholders nor the “C” shareholders are disadvantaged.
Holders of “C” shares receive the number of new ordinary shares that results from applying
the “conversion ratio”, which is the net asset value (NAV) attributable to each “C” share
divided by the undiluted NAV attributable to each existing ordinary share.  If the “C” shares
have an NAV of 100p and the ordinary shares have an NAV of 200p, the conversion ratio is
½ and therefore two “C” shares will convert into one ordinary share.  After conversion takes
place, the weighting of the investments in the portfolio of the investment trust is broadly as it
                                                
1   A variant of the “C” share issue, pioneered by Scottish Value Trust, is where the new shares instantly convert
and there is never a second portfolio.
2
was before the “C” share issue, but the merging of the two funds has enlarged the size of the
investment trust.
A “C” share issue is normally only feasible if the ordinary shares are trading at a premium to
NAV.  This makes subscribing for the “C” shares more attractive to investors than buying
ordinary shares in the market.  If the ordinary shares are trading at a discount, there is little
chance of a successful issue since there would be no incentive for investors to subscribe.
Most “C” share issues are pre-placed so there will be quite wide knowledge of the issue
before the official Stock Exchange announcement.  The broker involved as sponsor will try to
take out any loose holders at this stage, but other loose holders may emerge at a later stage
from other brokers who are not involved in the transaction.
In the case of trusts with warrants, there is the problem of how to calculate the number of
warrants to issue.  Warrants could be attached to the converted shares in the same ratio as had
applied to the original ordinary shares.  Thus, the converted shares would be identical in every
way to an original ordinary share.  It may be considered necessary, however, to issue a new
series of warrants on conversion as the original exercise price might be considered too far
away from the current NAV of the ordinary shares.
Rights issues still occur in the investment trust industry, but are now much less common.  In
1994, for example, 7 rights issues took place compared with 17 “C” share issues.  In Section
2, we set out the advantages and disadvantages of “C” share issues compared with rights
issues.
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2. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF “C” SHARE ISSUES
2.1 Advantages of the “C” share issue.
The many advantages of a “C” share issue compared with a rights issue are outlined below.
a) The “C” shares bear all the costs of the issue.  This is an equitable system because
only those investors purchasing shares pay the fees involved.  In a rights issue, the
administrative costs of the issue are reflected in the value of all shareholdings,
whether or not an existing shareholder wishes to subscribe for the issue.
b) In a rights issue, the subscription price is set at a discount to the share price at the time
of the announcement.  Should the stock market fall sufficiently for the shares to drop
below the subscription price, shareholders would not take up their rights.  The issue
would normally be underwritten, of course, but this incurs underwriting fees.  In a “C”
share issue, investors subscribe “up front” and the ratio of ordinary shares to “C”
shares is calculated later, at the time of conversion.  This eliminates much of the risk
of the share price falling.
c) The costs associated with a “C” share issue are lower than those for a rights issue.
Rights issues now only tend to occur when the amount of capital being raised is
relatively small compared with the market capitalisation of the investment trust in
question.  The existing shareholders do not object in this case to paying what are
relatively low fees for the rights issue.
d) The additional capital inflow from a rights issue inevitably leaves the investment trust
holding cash until such time as the additional funds have been invested.  This
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potentially distorts the investment return for existing shareholders.  This is not the
case with a “C” share issue.  The additional capital raised by the issue of “C” shares
will be accounted for as a separate pool of assets within the investment trust until
conversion takes place.  The NAV of the existing ordinary shares will thus be
unaffected by the introduction of the additional capital, and the “C” shares will have
an attributable net asset value based solely on the investment performance of the new
capital raised by their issue.
e) The fund managers need not rush into the investment of new money raised by a “C”
share issue because the two pools of assets are kept separate from each other.  This is
particularly important in the case of smaller company or emerging market funds for
which it may take time to invest the money.  The fund manager does not need to
explain the delay, it has effectively been agreed upon in advance by the new
shareholders.
2.2 Disadvantages of the “C” share issue
Disadvantages of the “C” share issues are concerned more with administrative complexity.
Running what are effectively two investment trusts side by side requires a more advanced
accounting system than for a single investment trust.  Until conversion, the investment trust
must be operated so that the assets attributable to the “C” shareholders can, at all times, be
separately identified.  In particular, separate cash accounts, broker settlement accounts and
investment ledger accounts must be created and maintained for the assets attributable to the
“C” shareholders.  Furthermore, separate earnings and dividend accounts are required and,
until conversion, the investment trust must allocate a fair proportion of every expense or
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liability of the company to the “C” shareholders.  Accounting procedures are particularly
complicated if the life of the “C” shares extends over an accounting year end.
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3. EVENT STUDY
The purpose of the event study in this paper is to examine the weekly “abnormal” or “excess”
returns earned by the ordinary shareholders, not only for the week of the “C” share issue
announcement itself but also for the weeks leading up to and after the “C” share issue
announcement.  We chose an event period consisting of 61 weeks, from 30 weeks before to
30 weeks after the week of the “C” share issue announcement (week zero).
3.1 Sample size
Between the first “C” share issue in the autumn of 1991 and the end of 1994, 37 “C” share
issues were made in the investment trust industry.  This is a relatively small sample size and
unfortunately it had to be reduced further.  The two split-capital investment trusts (Finsbury
Smaller Companies and Aberforth Split Level) were eliminated due to the ambiguity of the
different classes of shares, and Ptarmigan International Capital was eliminated due to lack of
data.  Finsbury Smaller Companies, one of the above splits, has had two “C” share issues, so
the final sample size was 33, down 4 from the original sample size.  (See Appendix 1).
3.2 Characteristics of the sample data
Descriptive data for the sample are given in the appendices indicated below.
1. Distribution of announcement dates2 - Appendix 1.
2. Distribution across AITC sub-sector - Appendix 2.
3. Distribution of trust market capitalisation - Appendix 3.
4. Distribution of issue size in relation to trust size - Appendix 4.
                                                
2  The “C” share issues tended to be bunched together, with three active periods: February 1993; October 1993
to November 1993; and January 1994 to March 1994.
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3.3 Choice of index for expected returns
Abnormal return is the difference between the actual (total) return observed and the expected
(total) return.  Three possibilities were considered for the determination of expected returns.
The event study could be carried out using a trust’s own benchmark index to determine
expected returns.  The benchmark adopted by a fund against which to measure its
performance should be that which corresponds as exactly as possible to the investment task
which the trust is setting out to achieve.  Many investment trusts state a single benchmark
index in their annual report.
A second alternative was to use the Association of Investment Trust Companies (AITC) sub-
sector averages such as Smaller Companies, Emerging Markets, Continental Europe, etc.  (see
Appendix 2).  One weakness of the AITC averages concerns single-country investment trusts.
The single country investment trusts are grouped together as Far East Single Country or
Europe Single Country.  The problem is that countries as diverse as Korea and Australia, or
Spain and Ireland, end up being averaged together.
A third alternative was to use a single all-encompassing index, such as the Financial Times-
Stock Exchange Actuaries All Share Index or the Financial Times - Stock Exchange
Actuaries Investment Trust (FT-SE A IT) Index.  The latter is preferable because all the
sample came from the investment trust sector.  Even so, it provides a rather crude assessment
of expected returns, given that investment trusts in the sample tend to be specialists, with over
half the sample from two sub-sectors - smaller companies and emerging markets.
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In the early stages of this research, it was thought that a trust’s own benchmark index should
be used to determine expected returns.  This would not only be an unusual approach,
however, as far as event studies are concerned, but also cumbersome.  In the end, a single
index, the FT-SE A IT Index, was chosen for the determination of expected returns for all the
investment trusts in the sample.  This allowed standard event study methodology to be
employed.
3.4 Average abnormal returns
The abnormal return for share i in week t is defined as the return on share i in week t less the
return on the FT-SE A IT Index in week t.  To assess the average performance of ordinary
shares over the event period, the average abnormal retrun (AAR) of all shares in the sample,
for each week in the event period, was then computed.
The average abnormal return for each week in the event period is illustrated in Figure 1.  The
most interesting feature of Figure 1 is the sudden change in trend just before week zero, with
small and mainly negative AARs experienced around week zero.  This follows a sustained
period of more than half a year of continuously positive AARs.
INSERT FIGURE 1
3.5 Cumulative average abnormal returns
Figure 2 shows the cumulation of the weekly average abnormal returns starting at week -30.
The Cumulative average abnormal return (CAR) is seen to increase steadily up to week -2.  A
slight fall is then witnessed between weeks -1 and +5.  The CAR then carries on upward,
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4. MOVEMENTS IN AVERAGE (RELATIVE) DISCOUNT/PREMIUM TO NAV
Weekly movements in discounts were studied for the period starting 52 weeks before the “C”
share issue announcement date and ending 52 weeks after the “C” share issue announcement
date.  AITC sub-sector average discounts were used to assess the relevance of movements in
an individual investment trust’s discount.  Each investment trust’s discount less its sub-sector
average discount3 was calculated for each week.  An arithmetic average of this number over
all the trusts in the sample was then calculated, to give the average relative discount for a
particular week.
The results are given in Figure 3.  All figures are negative reflecting the fact that trusts
announcing a “C” share issue tended to stand on a lower discount (or, more usually, a higher
premium) than that of their subsector average.4
INSERT FIGURE 3
On average, there was a slight increase in the relative premium rating over the year leading up
to a “C” share issue announcement.  After the announcement, there was on average a definite
slide in the relative premium for up to nine months but this had stabilised within one year of
the announcement.  Note that on average the trusts in the sample still stood on a clear relative
premium one year after the announcement.
                                                
3  The relevant sub-sectors were Smaller Companies, Emerging Markets and Continental Europe (see Appendix
2).  The single country and other miscellaneous trust discounts were analysed with reference to a general
investment trust index discount.
4  Strictly speaking, for trusts with warrants, the premium should be calculated on a package basis (ordinary and
warrants combined) which will give a higher premium.
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5. CONCLUSION
We have examined the abnormal returns and discount/premium to NAV behaviour of the
ordinary shares, both before and after the announcement of “C” share issues in the investment
trust sector.
There was generally positive abnormal performance of the shares ahead of a “C” share issue
announcement.  This was only to be expected as trusts tend to announce a “C” share issue
after a period of outperformance.  The reaction to the announcements tended to be negative
but this was not statistically significant.  More interestingly, there was a tendency for the
ordinary shares to outperform the FT-SE A IT Index on a six month view after the
announcement of a “C” share issue, despite a reduction in the premium to NAV rating of the
shares over the same period.
Assessing the reasons behind the results of a study of this kind can be no more than informed
conjecture.  However, we set out below a number of possible reasons for the results.
A) As the new money for a “C” share issue is invested in many of the same shares as are
held by the existing fund (which are often relatively unmarketable), there may have been a
tendency for the underlying NAV of the ordinary shares to be pushed up.  If this were
partially but not entirely recognised by the market, there would be a tendency for the ordinary
shares to outperform for a period, despite a reduction in the premium to NAV rating.
B) The issues were made in areas which were fashionable at the time, and if the
underlying asset classes (in particular smaller companies and emerging markets) generally
continued to show strong positive performance over the months following the issues, this
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could explain the outperformance of the trusts in the sample over the same period.  A good
way of testing this hypothesis would be to carry out an event study with expected returns
determined by the trusts’ own benchmarks or by the AITC sub-sector averages.
C) A “C” share issue will absorb market demand for the trust, hence the gradual
reduction in relative premium rating over the months following the issue.  Furthermore,  a
recent article in the Financial Mail on Sunday (5 November 1995) suggested that
“backscratching” can sometimes occur with share issues in the investment trust sector.  This
is where fund managers reciprocate by subscribing for each others’ new issues, a practice
which would tend to occur in difficult market conditions and which is to be frowned upon.
The fund managers should be taking decisions on the basis of investment criteria rather than
to save face.  Firms which subscribe as a “favour” are weak holders of the new shares, and are
likely to sell within months..  This “rotation back into the market” will exaggerate the
reduction in relative premium rating.
D) There may be a tendency for directors to “clean up” the underlying portfolio before a
“C” share issue, which might involve selling small illiquid “failure” stocks and revaluing
other unlisted securities conservatively so that existing shareholders are not disadvantaged.
This would be consistent with the negative average abnormal returns observed around the
time of the issues.
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A detailed account of this research is available from Ingrid Yeats, The Centre for Financial
Markets Research, Department of Business Studies, The University of Edinburgh.
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Appendix 1
Investment Trusts in the Sample Studied with Corresponding “C” Share Issue
Announcement Date
Investment Trust - (33) Announcement Date
Aberforth Smaller Companies 18 October 1991
Templeton Emerging Markets 20 January 1992
Scottish Value 26 August 1992
Beta Global Emerging Markets 10 September 1992
US Smaller Companies 22 December 1992
Fleming Emerging Markets 17 February 1993
Moorgate Smaller Companies Income 23 February 1993
Templeton Emerging Markets 23 February 1993
Fleming Claverhouse 11 May 1993
City Merchants High Yield 25 June 1993
Smaller Companies 28 September 1993
Foreign & Colonial Smaller Companies 18 October 1993
Pilot 26 October 1993
Morgan Grenfell Equity Income 3 November 1993
Amicable Smaller Enterprises 4 November 1993
Govett Emerging Markets 8 November 1993
Fleming Japanese 13 January 1994
Edinburgh Smaller Companies 25 January 1994
Emerging Markets Country 25 January 1994
Abtrust New Dawn 26 January 1994
NatWest Smaller Companies/Cty. Sm. Cos. 3 February 1994
Templeton Emerging Markets 10 February 1994
Beta Global Emerging Markets 17 February 1994
Fleming European Fledgling 21 February 1994
SHIRESCOT 21 February 1994
Hoare Govett Smaller Companies Index 28 February 1994
NM Smaller Australian Companies 28 February 1994
TR European Growth 1 March 1994
TR Property 14 March 1994
Baillie Gifford Shin Nippon 22 April 1994
INVESCO Korea 23 September 1994
Fleming & Colonial Emerging Markets 3 October 1994
Geared Income 9 December 1994
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Appendix 2
Investment Trusts in the Sample Studied, Grouped by AITC Sub Sector




Foreign & Colonial Smaller Companies
Hoare Govett Smaller Companies Income
Moorgate Smaller Companies Index
NatWest Smaller Companies/County Smaller Companies
Pilot
Shires High-Yielding Smaller Companies
Smaller Companies
Emerging Markets - (6)
Beta Global Emerging Markets
Emerging Markets Country
Fleming Emerging Markets
Foreign & Colonial Emerging Markets
Govett Emerging Markets
Templeton Emerging Markets




Abtrust New Dawn - (Far East - excluding Japan)
Baillie Gifford Shin Nippon - (Japan)
City Merchants High Yield - (High Income)
Fleming Claverhouse - (UK General)
Fleming Japanese - (Japan)
Geared Income - (High Income)
INVESCO Korea - (Far East - Single Country)
Morgan Grenfell Equity Income - (Income Growth)
NM Smaller Australian Companies - (Far East - Single Country)
Scottish Value - (Closed End Funds)
TR Property - (Property)
US Smaller Companies - (North America)
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Appendix 3






“C” share issue as a
% of Mkt Cap
Templeton Emerging Markets (2/94) 422.1 116 27%
Fleming Japanese 305.5 159.3 52%
Templeton Emerging Markets (2/93) 148.1 83.1 56%
Foreign & Colonial - Smaller Cos. 146.7 24.6 17%
Foreign & Colonial - Emrg. Mkts. 134.8 108.5 80%
TR Property 118.7 79 67%
Fleming Claverhouse 82.6 22.8 28%
Fleming Emerging Markets 80.4 48.9 61%
Abtrust New Dawn 79.2 30.6 39%
Beta Global Emerging Markets (2/94) 73.7 28.6 39%
Templeton Emerging Markets (1/92) 62.3 27.3 44%
TR European Growth 61.3 36.7 60%
Moorgate Smaller Companies Inc. 61.2 24.3 40%
Edinburgh Small Companies 60.0 20.6 34%
Pilot 59.2 15 25%
Amicable Smaller Enterprises 51.3 25 49%
Fleming European Fledgling 44.3 14.3 32%
Hoare Govett Smaller Companies Ind. 44.2 24.4 55%
Aberforth Split Level 39.6 47.4 120%
INVESCO Korea 37.5 18 48%
Morgan Grenfell Equity Income 33.4 14.3 43%
NatWest Smaller Cos. 32.8 35.8 109%
NM Smaller Australian Cos. 31.7 26.8 85%
Govett Emerging Markets 31.2 16.5 53%
Emerging Markets Country 30.5 10 33%
Finsbury Smaller Companies (9/94) 28.3 10.5 37%
Baillie Gifford Shin Nippon 28.3 22 78%
US Smaller Companies 27.1 39.2 145%
Geared Income 25.2 14.1 56%
Smaller Companies 21.9 23.8 109%
Beta Global Emerging Markets (9/92) 20.8 28.6 138%
SHIRESCOT 20.4 10.4 51%
City Merchants High Yield 19.5 6.3 32%
Aberforth Smaller Companies 18.6 53.2 286%
Finsbury Smaller Companies (5/93) 15.3 7.1 46%
Scottish Value 13.9 14.2 102%
Ptarmigan International Capital 11.0 9 82%
Appendix 4
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Investment Trusts Ranked by “C” Share Issue as a Percentage of Market Capitalisation
- (at the time of their “C” Share issue)
Trust “C” share issue as a





Aberforth Smaller Companies 286% 53.2 18.6
US Smaller Companies 145% 39.2 27.1
Beta Global Emerging Markets (9/92) 138% 28.6 20.8
Aberforth Split Level 120% 47.4 39.6
NatWest Smaller Companies 109% 35.8 32.8
Smaller Companies 109% 23.8 21.9
Scottish Value 102% 142 13.9
NM Smaller Australian Cos. 85% 26.8 31.7
Ptarmigan International Capital 82% 9.0 11.0
Foreign & Colonial - Emrg. Mkts. 80% 108.5 134.8
Baillie Gifford Shin Nippon 78% 22.0 28.3
TR Property 67% 79.0 118.7
Fleming Emerging Markets 61% 48.9 80.4
TR European Growth 60% 36.7 61.3
Templeton Emerging Markets (2/93) 56% 83.1 148.1
Geared Income 56% 14.1 25.2
Hoare Govett Smaller Companies Ind 55% 24.4 44.2
Govett Emerging Markets 53% 16.5 31.2
Fleming Japanese 52% 159.3 305.5
SHIRESCOT 51% 10.4 20.4
Amicable Smaller Enterprises 49% 25.0 51.3
INVESCO Korea 48% 18.0 37.5
Finsbury Smaller Companies (5/93) 46% 7.1 15.3
Templeton Emerging Markets (1/92) 44% 27.3 62.3
Morgan Grenfell Equity Income 43% 14.3 33.4
Moorgate Smaller Companies Inc. 40% 24.3 61.2
Beta Global Emerging Markets (2/94) 39% 28.6 73.7
Abtrust New Dawn 39% 30.6 79.2
Finsbury Smaller Companies (9/94) 37% 10.5 28.3
Edinburgh Small Companies 34% 20.6 60.0
Emerging Markets Country 33% 10.0 30.5
City Merchants High Yield 32% 6.3 19.5
Fleming European Fledgling 32% 14.3 44.3
Fleming Claverhouse 28% 22.8 82.6
Templeton Emerging Markets (2/94) 27% 116.0 422.1
Pilot 25% 15.0 59.2
Foreign & Colonial - Smaller Cos. 17% 24.6 146.7
